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Back to Basics: The Principles of Bank Merger Review
I. INTRODUCTION
When one bank seeks to merge with another, the bank must do so
with the approval of a federal regulatory agency.1 The Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) plays a key role in this process by reporting whether the
proposed merger violates any antitrust laws.2 In September of 2020, the
DOJ requested public comments as to whether it should revise the 1995
Bank Merger Competitive Review guidelines to reflect emerging trends
in the banking and financial services sector and modernize its approach
to bank merger review under antitrust laws.3 A review of bank merger
jurisprudence and an appraisal of the DOJ’s bank merger review both
support the assertion that the DOJ’s current guidelines for bank merger
review are outdated.4 Therefore, the DOJ’s guidelines should be
reconsidered in order to implement a more dynamic analysis.5
There is indication that bank merger regulations for a subset of
banks are yielding anticompetitive effects. 6 In 1963, United States v.
1. No merger between an insured depository institution can occur without the approval of
either the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. See Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12
U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2)(A)–(C) (2018).
2. See Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4)(A) (2018) (“[B]efore acting on
any application for approval of a merger transaction, the responsible agency shall request a
report on the competitive factors involved from the Attorney General of the United States . .
. .”).
3. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Div., Antitrust Division Seeks Public
Comments on Updating Bank Merger Review Analysis (Sept. 1, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/antitrust-division-seeks-public-comments-updating-bankmerger-review-analysis [https://perma.cc/BQM3-FYFN].
4. Id.
5. Twenty-seven comments were submitted in response to the DOJ’s request, highlighting
a general consensus that change over time has altered the way consumers engage with the
banking industry. Antitrust Division Banking Guidelines Review: Public Comments, U.S.
DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-division-bankingguidelines-review-public-comments [https://perma.cc/RX4X-CF9H].
6. See Indep. Cmty. Bankers of America, Comments in Response to the Department of
Justice Antitrust Division Request for Public Comments on Updated Bank Merger Review
Analysis 4 (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1330131/download
[https://perma.cc/L9VZ-M59G] (“Small banks in rural markets may struggle to gain
regulatory approval for mergers, and the process of seeking merger approval can drag on for
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Philadelphia National Bank7 established that commercial banking in the
United States is “primarily unit banking.”8 In other words, the American
banking system consisted of a decentralized system of independent local
banks and community banks at the time of the case.9 However, consumer
access to banks has changed significantly—even since the release of the
1995 Bank Merger Competitive Review guidelines—with innovations
like credit cards, debit cards, direct deposit, electronic money transfer,
nationwide ATM networks, and online banking.10 Moreover, small banks
in rural markets face considerable challenges in keeping up with these
innovations where there are regulatory burdens that make merging more
difficult.11
Consequently, there is a need to reign in bank consolidation.12
Insufficient oversight of merger activity among the country’s financial
institutions has resulted in “trillions of dollars in economic costs” and an
“unquantifiable level of harm” to American consumers. 13 A litany of
academics agree that the current bank merger regulation requires reform
that prioritizes the interest of the individuals and small businesses who
rely on banking institutions for deposits, commercial transactions, and
loan services. 14 Furthermore, the percentage of bank mergers approved
over a year. By contrast, large banks are often more easily able to satisfy the quantitative
anticompetitive analysis by divesting branches in certain markets.”).
7. 374 U.S. 321, 325 (1963).
8. United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 325 (1963).
9. See id. (“[C]ontrol of commercial banking is diffused throughout a very large number
of independent, local banks . . . rather than concentrated in a handful of nationwide banks . .
. .”).
10. Michael D. Noel, Comments in Response to the Department of Justice Antitrust
Division Request for Public Comments on Updated Bank Merger Review Analysis 4 (Oct. 9,
2020), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1330171/download [https://perma.cc/J9PX5VR5].
11. Indep. Cmty. Bankers of America, supra note 6.
12. Rohit Chopra calls for the Department of Justice and federal banking agencies to
reconsider the current “failed” approach to bank merger review. Rohit Chopra & Jeremy C.
Kress, Comments in Response to the Department of Justice Antitrust Division Request for
Public Comments on Updated Bank Merger Review Analysis 1 (Oct. 16, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1330326/download [https://perma.cc/A3HH-JVMJ].
13. Id. at 7–8.
14. See id. at 2 (identifying a considerable number of sources to support the argument that
low- and moderate-income individuals are discreetly impacted by bank consolidation); see
also Jeremy C. Kress, Modernizing Bank Merger Review, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 435, 440 (2020)
(“[Banking] agencies should substantially enhance their scrutiny of bank merger proposals
using the three statutory factors that to date have been overlooked in the legal literature—
namely, financial stability, the public interest, and financial and managerial considerations.”);
see also Vitaly M. Bord, Bank Consolidation and Financial Inclusion: The Adverse Effects of
Bank Mergers on Depositors 9 (Dec. 1, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
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in the past few years shows that regulators are accelerating the approval
process at an unprecedented pace. 15 Research shows that banking fees
increase when large banks consolidate with small banks through
mergers. 16 This indicates that bank mergers not only affect other banks
within the relevant market but also the consumers who rely on those
banking services.17 Additionally, there is a relationship between mergers
and accessible, inclusive banking for low-income households.18 In
particular, bank branch density has been observed to correlate negatively
with county poverty, indicating how access to banking services decrease
when bank branch density decreases.19 Thus, it’s likely the case that
households with a bank account are less likely to face financial strain.20
For example, there were 13,460 local banks and approximately
10,000 branch banks in 1960.21 Over a few short years, the Supreme
Court noted in Philadelphia National Bank that the number of
commercial banks in America had declined by 714, despite an additional
887 new banks and “a very substantial increase in the Nation’s credit
needs.”22 Of the 1,601 independent banks that were no longer in business,
1,503 ceased to exist due to a merger. 23 More recently, the 2019 merger
between Branch Banking and Trust Company (“BB&T”) and SunTrust
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/vbord/files/vbord__bank_consolidation_and_financial_inclusion_full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9U3H-HBTQ]
(asserting that acquisitions of small banks by large banks cause some low-income depositors
to exit the banking system, due to the high fees that large banks charge on deposit accounts).
15. See Kress, supra note 14, at 455 (“More recently . . . approval rates have climbed
steadily, exceeding the historical average and reaching a peak of 95% in 2018.”); see also
Lalita Clozel, Bank Mergers Get Faster Under Trump, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bank-mergers-get-faster-under-trump-11550059200
[https://perma.cc/PTF3-NG7B].
16. See Kress, supra note 14, at 459 (“[Bank] mergers tend to inflate the fees that banks
charge consumers to maintain deposit accounts and depress the interest rates that banks pay
to those accountholders [sic].”); see also Bord, supra note 14, at 6–9 (suggesting that some
financially fragile and unbanked households close their deposit accounts and exit the banking
system when they experience high account fees or minimum required balances that result
from bank consolidation).
17. See Kress, supra note 14, at 459; see also Bord, supra note 14, at 6–9.
18. See Claire Celerier & Adrien Matray, Bank-Branch Supply, Financial Inclusion and
Wealth Accumulation, 32 REV. OF FIN. STUDIES 4767, 4770 (2019) (suggesting that unbanked
households are constrained by the supply of banking services and can benefit from them)
19. Id. at 4774.
20. Id. at 4769–70 (“[W]e find that financial inclusion leads to the accumulation of both
liquid assets in households savings accounts, allowing them to earn interest, and durable
assets, namely vehicles. Banked households have a 56% higher probability of owning a
vehicle, and around $5,900 more dollars in their vehicle than their unbanked counterparts.”)
21. United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 325 (1963).
22. Id. at 325–26.
23. Id. at 326.
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Bank resulted in the closure of 175 branches as of early October of 2020
and is expected to close up to 800 branches in the following years. 24 The
DOJ played a significant role in this result because it conditioned its
merger approval on the future divestment of branches.25 Accordingly,
the DOJ’s efforts to update its merger guidelines are not without
significant consequence.
A proper evaluation and recommendation for future bank merger
guidelines should begin with a review of bank merger jurisprudence,
namely United States v. Philadelphia National Bank26 and United States
v. Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust Company.27 Bank merger
jurisprudence informs the review standards codified by the Bank Merger
Act of 1966, which is also used by the DOJ and other bank regulators. 28
The Bank Merger Act of 1966 instructs federal agencies to consider three
equally-weighted priorities: (1) preventing bank mergers that would
result in a monopoly; (2) preventing anticompetitive bank mergers; and
(3) ensuring that the convenience and needs of the communities to be
served are met.29 All things considered, these principles should remain
consistent with the jurisprudence, indicating that the substance of the
1995 Bank Merger Competitive Review guidelines and the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines do not require any major changes unless
they contradict the priorities inherent in bank merger law and
jurisprudence.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II provides a brief review
of bank merger legislation.30 Part III offers an overview of the Supreme
Court’s bank merger jurisprudence, identifying key areas in which the
24. Lauren Sullivan & Ali Shayan Sikander, Majority of BB&T, SunTrust Branch Closures
Still
to
Come,
S&P
GLOBAL
MKT
INTEL.,
(Oct.
5,
2020),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-newsheadlines/majority-of-bb-t-suntrust-branch-closures-still-to-come-60511261
[https://perma.cc/PP7N-ETQR].
25. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Divestitures in Order for
BB&T
and
SunTrust
to
Proceed
with
Merger
(Nov.
8,
2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-divestitures-order-bbt-andsuntrust-proceed-merger [https://perma.cc/UMA5-8LJS] (“The Department of Justice
announced today that BB&T Corporation (BB&T) and SunTrust Banks Inc. (SunTrust) have
agreed to divest 28 branches across North Carolina, Virginia, and Georgia with approximately
$2.3 billion in deposits to resolve antitrust concerns arising from BB&T’s proposed merger
with SunTrust.”).
26. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
27. 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
28. See Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (2018) (outlining the way regulators
should review a bank merger as informed by legislation and case law).
29. Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5).
30. See infra Part II.

2021]

BANK MERGER REVIEW

277

legal principles inform the aforementioned priorities. 31 Part IV outlines
the current government structure of bank merger regulatory oversight. 32
Finally, Part V considers how some recommendations reconcile with said
statutory intent and jurisprudence and concludes that any revision of the
current guidelines should remain wholly consistent with the Bank Merger
Act, as well as bank merger case law.33
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BANK MERGER LEGISLATION
In the early 1900s, Congress struggled to balance the interests of
free competition while reigning in the power of banks amassed through
mergers and acquisitions.34
The primary laws that regulate
anticompetitive business practices are the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890
(“Sherman Act”)35 and the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 (“Clayton
Act”). 36 The Sherman Act specifies that any proposed merger “in
restraint of trade or commerce” is illegal,37 while the Clayton Act states
that no business engaged in commerce shall participate in a merger that
would “substantially lessen competition[,] or restrain such commerce.” 38
Banks were largely considered exempt from federal antitrust laws
because it was commonly understood that banking was not commerce as
referred to in the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. 39 The National Bank
Consolidation and Merger Act of 191840 designated the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) to supervise mergers between state
and national banks while the Banking Act of 193341 delegated authority
to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Federal
31. See infra Part III.
32. See infra Part IV.
33. See infra Part V.
34. See Earl W. Kintner & Hugh C. Hansen, A Review of the Law of Bank Mergers, 14

BOS. COLL. L. REV. 213, 213–16 (1972) (highlighting the “dichotomy of views” that shaped
the notion of free banking prior to the Bank Merger Act of 1960).
35. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended . at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1–7).
36. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended
in 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27).
37. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
38. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, § 7 ,15 U.S.C. § 18.
39. See Transamerica Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., 206 F.2d 163, 166 (3d
Cir. 1953) (noting that the members of Congress had not specifically contemplated that the
antitrust laws classified banking entities as corporations engaged in commerce).
40. National Bank Consolidation and Merger Act, § 20, Pub. L. No. 86-230, 73 Stat. 460,
12 U.S.C. §§ 215–215b (effective Dec. 28, 2012).
41. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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Reserve Board”) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) over member and nonmember banks. However, antitrust
standards had not yet been contemplated to a degree sufficient to
determine whether a combination was truly anticompetitive.42
Up until the 1950s, bank mergers proliferated and created much
larger banking institutions with an unprecedented amount of capital. 43
For example, Congressman Emanual Celler bemoaned a merger between
two of the largest banks in New York City in 1959—Manufacturers Trust
Co., the third largest bank, and Bankers Trust Co., the sixth largest
bank.44 Manufacturers Trust maintained over $3 billion in total assets,
while Bankers Trust reported total assets in excess of $2.8 billion.45 After
the merger, 70% of the city’s total bank assets were left in the hands of
four financial institutions.46 Despite the concerns raised by Congressman
Cellar, the increasing frequency of bank mergers remained unchecked by
the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act.47 While focused on antitrust
generally, Congress reexamined the Clayton Act and amended it with the
Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act of 1950 (“C-K Anti-Merger Act”). 48
The C-K Anti-Merger Act revised the Clayton Act to clarify that no
business could engage in an asset acquisition, a type of merger used by
banks, that would substantially lessen competition.49 The amendment
also restricted antitrust laws to apply only to corporations regulated by
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).50
Armed with the newly-amended Clayton Act, the Federal
Reserve Board challenged the acquisition of stocks of certain
42. See Joseph E. Casson & Bernie R. Burrus, Federal Regulation of Bank Mergers, 18
AM. U. L. REV. 677, 682 (1969) (“[N]either . . . [the National Bank Consolidation and Merger
Act of 1918 or the Federal Deposit Insurance Act] contained any provisions relating to any
standards to be applied by the respective agencies in determining the competitive aspects of
the banking combinations.”); see also Kintner & Hansen, supra note 34, at 218 (“For many
years bank mergers were considered out of the reach of the antitrust laws.”)
43. See Kintner & Hansen, supra note 34, at 220 (“[A] strong bank merger trend developed
in the early 1950’s . . . [resulting in] 1,300 bank combinations involving over 26 billion dollars
. . . .”).
44. 105 CONG. REC. A721 (1959) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Kintner & Hansen, supra note 34, at 219 (“At the time it was generally thought that the
phrase ‘subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission’ exempted banks from
application of the asset provision, since Section 11 of the [Clayton] Act specifically gave
jurisdiction over banks to the Federal Reserve Board.”).
48. See Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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independent commercial banks by Transamerica Corporation in 1953.51
However, the Third Circuit would not hold that the bank merger violated
the recently revised Clayton Act.52 Instead, the court delivered a minor
success for the statute by acknowledging that there was a legal
justification for applying the Clayton Act to review the antitrust
implications of bank mergers.53 The court acknowledged that even
though Congress customarily dealt with banks through legislation
separate and apart from general antitrust legislation, the power to extend
the scope of the Clayton Act to bank mergers still existed through the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.54 In other words, banking would
be considered commerce under the purview of antitrust legislation.55
Certain restrictions to Federal Reserve Board, FDIC, and OCC
oversight made it possible for some banks to avoid review by any of the
three federal banking agencies. 56 For example, the Federal Reserve
Board could only review a merger if it would create a member bank with
a smaller capital or surplus than the combined capital or surplus of the
banks involved in the transaction.57 Similarly, the FDIC could not review
mergers of FDIC-insured state banks that were not members of the
Federal Reserve System unless the total capital stock or surplus of the
resulting or assuming bank was less than the aggregate capital stock or
aggregate surplus, respectively, of all the merging or consolidating banks
or all of the parties to the assumptions of the liabilities. 58 Finally, if a
national bank purchased assets and assumed liabilities of another bank,
the OCC’s approval was not directly required unless the capital stock or
surplus of the assuming bank would be less than the aggregate capital
stock or surplus of the combining banks.59

51. Transamerica Corp v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 206 F.2d 163, 164 (3d
Cir. 1953).
52. Id. at 170.
53. Id. at 165.
54. See id. at 166 (“We find nothing in the legislative history . . . to indicate that Congress
did not intend by Section 7 to exercise its power under the commerce clause of the
Constitution to the fullest extent.”).
55. Casson & Burrus, supra note 42, at 683 (“While the Federal Reserve failed to
accomplish its ultimate purpose [in Transamerica Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys.], it succeeded in establishing that banking operations did constitute ‘commerce’
within the meaning of the Clayton Act.”).
56. Kintner & Hansen, supra note 34, at 221; see also Stanley D. Waxberg and Stanley D.
Robinson, Chaos in Federal Regulation of Bank Mergers: A Need for Legislative Revision,
82 BANKING L. J. 377, 385 (1965).
57. Kintner & Hansen, supra note 34, at 221.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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Despite the clarifications made by the C-K Anti-Merger Act
amendments, the language of the Clayton Act was still not sufficient to
prevent anticompetitive bank mergers because the Act stated that antitrust
laws only applied to corporations subject to FTC’s jurisdiction.60
Implicitly, this meant that the DOJ could not conclude that section 7 of
the Clayton Act applied to bank mergers.61 Congress attempted to resolve
these issues by enacting the Bank Merger Act of 1960, which gave the
three federal bank regulatory agencies and the DOJ approval rights over
bank mergers. 62 The Bank Merger Act of 1960 charged the agencies with
considering two main factors: banking and competitiveness.63 The
banking factor included consideration of: (1) the financial history and
condition of each of the banks involved; (2) the adequacy of the resulting
bank’s structure; (3) the merged bank’s future earnings prospects; (4) the
general character of the resulting bank’s management; (5) the
convenience and needs of the community to be served; and (6) whether
or not the bank‘s corporate powers were consistent with the purpose of
the Act.64 The competitive factor referred to the effect of the transaction
to substantially lessen competition and any tendency toward monopoly.65
Accordingly, the Bank Merger Act of 1960 empowered regulatory
agencies to review bank mergers; however, it did not provide guidance
on how to weigh the various anticompetitive factors listed in the
legislation.66
The prevailing question for the DOJ and the banking regulatory
agencies is how to determine whether a merger has substantially lessened
competition.67 Procedurally, the legislation instructed the merging banks
to apply to the responsible agency for approval. 68 The responsible agency

60. Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1950).
61. The position of “most observers before 1960” was that section 7 failed to cover asset

acquisition by banks. See Kintner & Hansen, supra note 34, at 220 (highlighting a 1955
congressional testimony by the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust
Division).
62. Bank Merger Act of 1960, Pub. L. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1828(c)).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 1828(i)(4)(D).
65. Id. § 1828(c)(1)(C).
66. See Kintner & Hansen, supra note 34, at 223 (“As a result of this ambiguity [regarding
the competitive factor element], the three banking agencies developed different policies in
applying the criteria set up in the statute.”).
67. It is necessary to note that the DOJ, OCC, FDIC, and the FRB do not individually
review all merger applications. Instead, the regulatory agency responsible for issuing a merger
approval will depend upon the nature of the merged entity. See infra Part IV.
68. Bank Merger Act of 1960, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(6).
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must then notify the Attorney General of any approval.69 Once notified,
the DOJ provides final comment on the competitive factors observed in
the application process.70 After the Bank Merger Act of 1960, there were
two opposing philosophies as to how the DOJ should evaluate bank
merger applications.71 On one hand, some argue that banks were so
central to the proper functioning of the economy that the traditional
antitrust goal of restraining undue concentration “is as important to
banking as in any other field.”72 On the other hand, some believed that
increased concentration would yield stronger institutions able to
“safeguard against failure.”73 In search of an answer, the DOJ filed five
bank merger suits in 1961.74 Philadelphia National Bank was the first of
these five cases to reach the Supreme Court and its holding effectively
ratified the bank merger test as it exists today.75
III. THE BANK MERGER TEST
Pursuant to the Bank Merger Act of 1960, a bank merger review
consists of a two-step analysis.76 First, the entity tasked with oversight
must decide whether the proposed merger would possess any
anticompetitive effects or incur “any tendency toward monopoly.”77
Then, if the entity tasked with oversight finds that the combination
violates the first step, it must decide whether “the transaction [is] in the
public interest.”78 Philadelphia National Bank initiated the process of
interpreting and fine tuning the language of the Bank Merger Act of 1960

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Kintner & Hansen, supra note 34, at 213–16 (outlining a “dichotomy of views”

regarding the value of competition in banking).
72. Id. at 216.
73. Id.
74. United States v. Mfr. Hanover Tr. Co., No. 61-C-3194 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 8, 1961);
United States v. Continental Ill. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., No. 61-C-1441 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug.
29, 1961); United States v. Bank Stock Corp., No. 61-C-54 (E.D. Wis. filed Mar. 2, 1961);
United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, No. 29287 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 25, 1961).
75. U.S. v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
76. Bank Merger Act of 1960, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c); see also Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374
U.S. at 332 n.8 (1963) (applying the bank merger test to a bank merger).
77. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 332 n.8.
78. Id.
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to more clearly indicate how the language of the statute contemplates
antitrust values.79
A.

United States v. Philadelphia National Bank

In Philadelphia National Bank,80 the named bank proposed a
merger agreement by which Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank’s (“Girard
Trust”) shareholders would surrender their shares in exchange for shares
in the consolidated bank.81 Philadelphia National Bank’s shareholders
would retain their original shares.82 Pursuant to the Bank Merger Act of
1960,83 the OCC presided as the primary regulatory agency and would
receive reports from the Federal Reserve Board, FDIC, and the DOJ with
their recommendations.84 Each of the three disagreed with the OCC and
advised that the proposed merger would have substantial anticompetitive
effects in the Philadelphia metropolitan area. 85
The Supreme Court began its analysis by considering whether
section 7 of the Clayton Act applied to bank mergers.86 The answer
turned on a chain of inferences rooted in the text of the Clayton Act.87
The statute applies to acquisitions of corporate stock or share capital by
any corporation engaged in commerce.88 Furthermore, the text of section
7 applies where there are acquisitions of corporate stock or share capital
by corporations, but only if those corporations are subject to the
jurisdiction of the FTC.89 In other words, if the Court decided to label
the merger between Philadelphia National Bank and Girard Trust as an

79. See id. at 350–53 (expounding on the effect of the Bank Merger Act of 1960 as
contemplated by Congress).
80. Id. at 321.
81. Id. at 331–32.
82. Id. at 331.
83. Bank Merger Act of 1960, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c).
84. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 332.
85. Id. at 332–33.
86. Id. at 335.
87. Id. at 335–37.
88. Id. at 340 n.18.
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(2) (1914) (“The [Federal Trade] Commission is hereby
empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks,
savings and loan institutions . . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”); see also
Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 335–36 (1963) (“By its terms, the present § 7 reaches
acquisitions of corporate stock or share capital by any corporation engaged in commerce, but
it reaches acquisitions of corporate assets only by corporations ‘subject to the jurisdiction of
the Federal Trade Commission.’”).
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asset acquisition, then the merger would not be considered illegal.90 This
is because, according to the text of the Clayton Act, an asset acquisition
between banks was not illegal, whereas an asset acquisition by any
corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC would be illegal.91 This
line of reasoning exposed a loophole in the Bank Merger Act of 1960.92
In order to proceed, the Court turned to legislative intent.93
Indeed, the Court reasoned that because Congress intended to “control
corporate concentrations tending to monopolies,” the Clayton Act at a
minimum applied to mergers and consolidations.94 In amending the
Clayton Act with the C-K Anti-Merger Act, Congress further sought to
close a loophole in the statute to prevent one corporation from acquiring
another corporation by pure asset acquisition.95 The Supreme Court
worked around the loophole by holding that “the specific exception for
acquiring corporations not subject to the FTC’s jurisdiction excludes
from the coverage of [section] 7 only assets acquisitions by such
corporations when not accomplished by merger.” 96
The Supreme Court supported this decision with three reasons:
(1) any other interpretation would defeat the acknowledged purpose of
section 7 of the Clayton Act; (2) Congress had contemplated the type of
merger at issue in Philadelphia National Bank and; (3) legislative history
proves that the phrase limiting the Clayton Act to corporations subject to
the FTC was meant to define the role of the FTC rather than to limit the
jurisdiction of the antitrust law itself.97 After the Court resolved this
issue, it designated the bank merger test to determine whether the
proposed merger violated antitrust law.98

90. See Philadelphia Nat’l Bank 374 U.S. at 336 n.13 (distinguishing the legal difference
between a merger and an asset acquisition).
91. See Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (establishing in pertinent part
that no person subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce
where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly).
92. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 337 (“[A] merger fits neither category neatly.”)
93. See id. (“We must determine whether a congressional design to embrace bank mergers
is revealed in the history of the statute.”).
94. Id. at 338.
95. See id. at 341 n.19 (“The purpose of the [C-K Anti-Merger amendments to Section 7]
is to prevent corporations from acquiring another corporation by means of the acquisition of
its assets . . . [where failure to do so] has been inconsistent and paradoxical as to the over-all
effect of existing law.”).
96. Id. at 342.
97. Id. at 343–49.
98. Id. at 355–72.
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Philadelphia National Bank applies a statutory test that centers
on whether the proposed merger substantially lessens competition in “any
line of commerce” in “any section of the country.”99 For this reason, the
Court determined the relevant product (or services market) and the
relevant geographical market in which to assess the anticompetitive
nature of the proposed merger. 100 Also, consistent with Congress’
legislative intent to prevent undue concentration, the Supreme Court
restricted this standard to “proving illegality only with respect to mergers
whose size makes them inherently suspect.”101 For example, the merger
of the appellees in Philadelphia National Bank would have resulted in a
single bank controlling at least 30% of the commercial banking business
in the four-county Philadelphia metropolitan area.102 The Court refrained
from establishing a bottom threshold for this standard, 103 emphasizing
that the test is not only whether small competitors flourish but also
whether consumers are well-served.104 Furthermore, the Court insisted
that its ruling on the competitive nature of the proposed merger was not
arbitrary since neither the antitrust laws nor legislative history allude to a
particular percentage being sufficient to determine whether the merger
substantially lessens competition.105
At its core, Philadelphia National Bank exposed the insufficiency
of the Bank Merger Act of 1960 in adequately addressing bank merger
review. 106 Once that problem was solved, the Philadelphia National
Bank court applied a traditional antitrust review that culminated in the
analysis and application modeled seven years later in United States v.
Phillipsburg National Bank and Trust Co.107 In the time between those

99. Id. at 355.
100. Id. at 356; see also United States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. 399 U.S.

350, 357–58 (1970) (“We entertain no doubt that this factual pattern requires a determination
whether the merger passes muster under the antitrust standards of United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank . . . .”); see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 370 U.S.
294 (outlining the merger analysis in further detail).
101. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363.
102. Id. at 364.
103. See id. at 365 n.41 (“Needless to say, the fact that a merger results in a less-than-30%
market share, or in a less substantial increase than in the instant case, does not raise an
inference that the merger is not violative of § 7.”) (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 367 n.43.
105. Id. at 365.
106. See id. at 337 (“[W]e have been directed to no previous case in which a merger of
consolidation was challenged under § 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, where the acquiring
corporation was not subject to the FTC’s jurisdiction.”).
107. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
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two cases, the DOJ proceeded to challenge bank mergers in an effort to
scale back a “rising tide of unhealthy bank mergers.”108
Shortly after Philadelphia National Bank, the DOJ brought
another challenge to a bank merger pursuant to sections one and two of
the Sherman Act, which gives the DOJ the authority to enjoin any bank
merger with a tendency towards forming a monopoly.109 In United States
v. First National Bank & Trust Company of Lexington,110 the Court held
that the Sherman Act applied to the facts, rather than the Clayton Act,
because the merger’s standard of legality changed from assessing stock
or asset acquisitions to a contract in restraint of trade or commerce. 111
Looking for an unreasonable restraint of trade, the Court considered the
size of the consolidated bank’s trust departments after the proposed
merger and found that they would hold 94.82% of all trust assets, 92.20%
of all trust department earnings, and 79.62% of all trust accounts within
the established geographic area. 112 Additionally, testimony on the record
from three of the four remaining banks indicated that the consolidation
would seriously affect their ability to compete effectively.113 As a result,
the Supreme Court agreed and found that significant competition would
be eliminated by consolidation.114
B.

Post-Philadelphia National Bank Changes to the Bank Merger
Test

After the Philadelphia National Bank decision, Congress passed
the Bank Merger Act of 1966.115 This law clarified procedure and
established standards consistent with both the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act.116 The DOJ would now be required to report on the
competitive factors for all bank merger applications and provide a final

108. Casson & Burrus, supra note 42, at 688.
109. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2.
110. United States v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
111. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 376 U.S. at 671–72.
112. Id. at 669.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Bank Merger Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 12

U.S.C. § 1828(c) (2018)).
116. See Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(1) (providing that no insured bank
may merge or consolidate in any manner without the approval of the banking agency having
jurisdiction over it); see also Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)
(reestablishing the antitrust standards for a bank merger evaluation).
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check on any anticompetitive inquiry.117 It was argued that the OCC’s
decision on a bank merger would function like a final administrative
ruling; however, the Supreme Court held that a challenge on antitrust
grounds would need to be adjudicated.118 The Bank Merger Act of 1966
clarified that any proposed merger transaction “[resulting] in a monopoly
. . . in furtherance of any combination or conspiracy to monopolize or to
attempt to monopolize the business of banking in any part of the United
States” shall not be approved.119 The Act also stated that any proposed
merger transaction “whose effect in any section of the country may be
substantially to lessen competition, or . . . in any other manner would be
in restraint of trade” shall not be approved.120 This revision removed the
loophole problem encountered in Philadelphia National Bank by
explicitly stating that the “responsible agency” would evaluate the merger
transaction with the intent of applying the standards of the antitrust
laws.121 Finally, the 1966 amendment rewrote the public interest
component of the review by allowing bank merger approval even when
anticompetitive effects are present, “if the proposed transaction [is]
clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the
transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be
served.”122
In 1968, the Supreme Court decided Third National Bank, which
clarified the standard of review for claims made pursuant to the Bank
Merger Act of 1966 and defined the convenience-and-needs-of-thecommunity analysis of the Bank Merger Act.123 The District Court,
considered the challenge to the proposed bank merger by the DOJ and
asserted that the Bank Merger Act altered the standards used in evaluating
whether a bank merger violates the antitrust laws. 124 However, the
Supreme Court disagreed, stating that Congress intended bank mergers
117. Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4)(A)(i)–(ii) (“In the interests of
uniform standards and subject to subparagraph (B), before acting on any application for
approval of a merger transaction, the responsible agency shall (i) request a report on the
competitive factors involved from the Attorney General of the United States; and (ii) provide
a copy of the request to the Corporation (when the Corporation is not the responsible
agency)”).
118. United States v. First City Nat’l Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361, 367–69 (1967) (“A
determination of the effect on competition within the meaning of § 7 of the Clayton Act is a
familiar judicial task.”)
119. Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(A).
120. Id. § 1828(c)(5)(B).
121. Id. § 1828(c)(2)–(5).
122. Id. § 1828(c)(5).
123. United States v. Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
124. The District Court justified its reasoning with a case that had been deemed “confined
to its special facts.” Id. at 181.
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to be subject to the usual antitrust analysis. 125 The Court held that if a
merger posed a choice between preserving competition and satisfying the
requirements of convenience and need, “the injury and benefit were to be
weighed and decision was to rest on which alternative better served the
public interest.”126
By the late 1960s, the general understanding was that antitrust
law held firm as a strong roadblock for many large banks that aimed to
grow through consolidation.127 The Bank Merger Act of 1966 established
the convenience-and-needs-of-the-community defense and provided the
DOJ with the ability to automatically stay a merger approval once it has
filed suit.128 This proved beneficial even though the same legislation only
provided the DOJ with thirty days after the notice of a bank merger
proposal to bring an action.129 Nonetheless, the DOJ proceeded to
challenge anticompetitive practices, making a significant case of United
States v. Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust Company.130
When Phillipsburg National Bank and Second National Bank of
Phillipsburg proposed their merger, the requisite independent reports
obtained from the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, and the DOJ all
viewed the problem as involving commercial banking in PhillipsburgEaston131 and reported that the merger would have a “significantly
harmful effect” on competition in that area.132 The OCC disagreed,
finding that the other agencies had defined the product and geographic
markets too narrowly and that those agencies should have treated the
greater Lehigh Valley region as the relevant geographic area.133 In effect,
this would have required the agencies to evaluate competition from thirtyfour finance companies and thirteen savings and loan institutions, as well
125. Id. at 182.
126. Id. at 185.
127. See Kintner & Hansen, supra note 34, at 233 (“Bankers were upset because [the

Philadelphia National Bank decision] not only presented problems for future bank mergers
but also threatened the legality of approximately two thousand bank mergers that occurred
since the [C-K Anti Merger Act].”).
128. Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A).
129. Id. § 1828(c)(6); see also Kintner & Hansen, supra note 34 at 237 (“Mergers
consummated prior to June 17, 1963, the date of the Philadelphia Bank decision, were
conclusively presumed to have not been in violation of any antitrust laws other than Section
2 [of the Sherman Act]. This gave immunity to . . . two thousand mergers as well as to the
Manufacturers-Hanover, Continental-Illinois and Lexington Bank mergers.”).
130. 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
131. Phillipsburg-Easton is a region consisting of a small city (Phillipsburg) and a small
town (Easton) separated by the Delaware River in the southwestern corner of Warren County,
New Jersey. Id. at 353–54.
132. Id. at 358.
133. Id.
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as from the more than thirty commercial banks in the area. 134 This
contention was significant because the merging banks in Phillipsburg
National Bank were noted as smaller banks than previously challenged in
bank merger violations, indicating that bank size no longer mitigates
whether a bank merger violates antitrust laws.135
The Supreme Court evaluated the issue by outlining the terms of
the bank merger test as it has been finalized in the Bank Merger Act of
1966.136 The first step is whether a merger substantially lessens
competition in any line of commerce in any section of the country.137 An
analysis under this first step involves: (1) identifying the relevant product
market; (2) identifying the relevant geographic market; and (3) assessing
the anticompetitive effect of the merger.138 For the second step, if a
proposed merger substantially lessens competition, the proposed merger
shall not be approved unless the anticompetitive effects are clearly
outweighed by the public interest in meeting the convenience and needs
of the community to be served.139 The community to be served must be
the geographic market established earlier in the bank merger analysis. 140
Evaluation of convenience and needs in an area smaller than the
geographic market could result in the approval of a merger that has a
countervailing beneficial impact in only part of the market. 141
IV. CURRENT OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT OF BANK MERGERS
The Bank Merger Act of 1966 provides the current legal standard for
reviewing bank mergers and enlists the coordination of four federal
agencies to oversee and enforce the application process, depending on the

134. Id. at 358–59.
135. Id. at 358 (“Mergers of directly competing small commercial banks in small

communities, no less than those of large banks in large communities, are subject to scrutiny
under these standards.”).
136. Id. at 357–58 (“We entertain no doubt that this factual pattern requires a determination
whether the merger passes muster under the antitrust standards of United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank . . . which were preserved in the Bank Merger Act of 1966.”)
137. Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B); U.S. v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank
and Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 357–58 (1970); see also United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 355 (1963) (analyzing the merger test under the Bank Merger Act of
1960); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334–46 (1962) (analyzing the merger
test in detail).
138. Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5); Phillipsburg Nat‘l Bank & Tr. Co.,
399 U.S. at 359–69.
139. Id. § 1828(c)(5); Phillipsburg Nat‘l Bank and Tr. Co., 399 U.S. at 370–71.
140. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank and Tr. Co., 399 U.S. at 371.
141. Id.
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regulator of the merging banks and the resulting bank.142 The OCC
reviews the merger application if the acquiring, assuming, or resulting
bank will become a national bank.143 The Federal Reserve Board reviews
merger applications if the acquiring, assuming, or resulting bank will
become a state member bank. 144 The FDIC reviews a merger application
if the acquiring, assuming, or resulting bank will become a state
nonmember insured bank.145 The DOJ must also furnish a report
regarding the competitive factors arising from any proposed merger,
unless an exception applies.146
Regulators could, in theory, apply inconsistent and confusing
standards to bank merger applications.147 The Supreme Court’s holding
in Philadelphia National Bank contravened “conventional wisdom” by
imposing the Clayton and Sherman Acts onto bank merger review
standards, effectively subverting liberal interpretations of the standard of
anticompetitive effects.148 Furthermore, each of the cases decided after
Philadelphia National Bank arose from conflicting regulatory agency
views on the competitive effects of bank mergers, affirming how the
respective goals and missions of the OCC, Federal Reserve Board, FDIC,
and DOJ play an appreciable role in the intergovernmental conflicts that
arise when approving bank mergers amid anticompetitive concerns. 149
142. Bank Merger Act of 1966 § , 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2).
143. Id. § 1828(c)(2)(A).
144. Id. § 1828(c)(2)(B).
145. Id. §1828(c)(2)(C).
146. Id. § 1828(c)(4)–(5).
147. See Gina M. Killian, Bank Mergers and the Department of Justice’s Horizontal

Merger Guidelines: A Critique and Proposal, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 857, 857 (1994)
(“Tension exists between [Fed. Reserve Board and the Department of Justice] because at
times they disagree on the presence of anticompetitive effects in the post-merger
environment.”); see also Kress, supra note 14, at 445 (“Rather than clarifying the federal
government’s role in bank mergers . . . the Bank Merger Act amplified confusion about
antitrust enforcement in banking.”).
148. Kress, supra note 14, at 445.
149. All cases reflect that the Federal Reserve Board, FDIC, and DOJ advise that the
proposed mergers would have substantial anticompetitive effects while the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency approved the mergers. See e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat’l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 332–33 (1963) (“All three reports advised that the proposed merger
would have substantial anticompetitive effects in the Philadelphia metropolitan area[,] . . .
[h]owever, . . . the Comptroller approved the merger.”); see also United States v. First Nat’l
Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665, 667 (1964) (“Each report concluded that the
consolidation would adversely affect competition among commercial banks in Fayette
County[,] . . . [n]onetheless, the Comptroller of the Currency approved the consolidation . . .
.”); see also United States v. Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171, 178–79 (1968)
(“The Comptroller of the Currency . . . concluded that the merger would not lessen
competition and would ‘improve the charter bank’s ability to serve the convenience and needs
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The DOJ’s interest in regulating bank mergers lies in the
enforcement of antitrust guidelines.150 This interest is jurisprudential in
nature, with a primary focus on defining the law as it pertains to public
policy.151 For example, the Attorney General shapes bank merger
antitrust jurisprudence by deciding which bank mergers to challenge, a
decision guided by the public interest.152 On the other hand, the OCC
must ensure the safety and soundness of fair access to financial services
while also enforcing the fair treatment of customers by their banks.153
This interest diverges from the DOJ because the OCC’s interest more
likely prioritizes the economic impact of the merger.154 Moreover, the
FDIC is responsible for insuring the deposits of all banks and savings
associations which are entitled to said benefits.155 Within the context of
a bank merger, the interest of the FDIC prioritizes the strength of the

of the Nashville public [despite the concerns expressed by the reports of the Fed. Reserve
Board, FDIC, and Dept. of Justice].”). But see United States v. First City Nat’l Bank of
Houston, 386 U.S. 361, 364 (1967) (“Requests were made of the Attorney General and the
Federal Reserve Board pursuant to [the Bank Merger Act of 1966] for their views and both
submitted reports to the Comptroller that the merger would have serious anticompetitive
effects.”).
150. The mission of the Antitrust Division is the “promotion and maintenance of
competition in the American economy . . . . [t]hrough participation in the Executive Branch
activities and in regulatory and legislative processes, the Division seeks to ensure the
Government action is procompetitive or not unnecessarily anticompetitive. Through its own
litigation, amicus filings, and in a variety of other public forums, the Division also seeks to
guide the advancement of antitrust jurisprudence.” DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION
MANUAL CHAPTER I–ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ANTITRUST DIVISION (5th ed.
2018)
[hereinafter
DOJ
ANTITRUST
DIVISION
MANUAL]
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761126/download [https://perma.cc/JTX5-2YPY].
151. See Judiciary Act of 1789, Sept. 24, 1789, ch 20, 1 Stat. 73, 93 (“[The Attorney
General] shall . . . prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United
States shall be concerned, and . . . give his advice and opinion upon questions of law when
required by the President of the United States, or when requested by the heads of any of the
departments, touching any matters that may concern their departments . . . .”).
152. Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7) (providing that any action by a
defendant bank or the Attorney General may be taken within the earliest time to challenge a
bank merger).
153. Id. § 1(a).
154. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1(a) (“[T]he Office of the Comptroller of the Currency . . . is
charged with assuring the safety and soundness of, and compliance with laws and regulations,
fair access to financial services, and fair treatment of customers by, the institutions and other
persons subject to its jurisdiction.”) (quotations omitted), with Judiciary Act of 1789, Sept.
24, 1789, ch 20, 1 Stat. 73, 93 (“[The Attorney General] shall . . . prosecute and conduct all
suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned, and . . . give his
advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the President of the United States,
or when requested by the heads of any of the departments, touching any matters that may
concern their departments . . . .”).
155. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 2, 12 U.S.C. § 1811(a) (2018).
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merging bank and its impact on surrounding banks.156 Finally, the Board
of Governors is charged with serving the public interest by promoting
“the effective operation of the U.S. economy.”157
The OCC evaluates a broad array of factors in evaluating a
proposed bank merger. 158 The agency considers the following factors:
(1) the combined amount of capital resulting from the merger; (2) the
legality of the merger; (3) the purpose of the merger; (4) the impact of the
merger on the safety and soundness of the national bank; and (5) the effect
of the transaction on the national bank’s shareholders, depositors, other
creditors, and customers.159 These factors address the anticompetitive
effects of the merger, the financial and managerial resources of the banks
in their current form and their proposed mergers, the convenience and
needs of the community, the merged bank’s ability to combat money
laundering, the merged bank’s impact on the financial stability of the
banking and financial system and whether the merged bank would exceed
any deposit concentration limits.160 Finally, the OCC takes into account
an evaluation under information obtained through the Community
Reinvestment Act.161
When evaluating a proposed merger, the Federal Reserve Board
considers three factors that focus on the strength of the bank itself and the
likely benefit of the merger on the banking system.162 Specifically, the
Federal Reserve Board considers: (1) whether the proposed transaction
would violate antitrust laws by establishing a monopoly or significantly
lessen competition;163 (2) whether the merging banks have provided the
Board with adequate information regarding its operations; 164 and (3)
whether the convenience and needs of the communities are served by the
proposed merger. 165

156. See id. (“[The FDIC] shall . . . insure, as hereinafter provided, the deposits of all banks
and savings associations which are entitled to the benefits of insurance under this chapter, and
which shall have the powers hereinafter granted.”)
157. FED. RES. BD., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 1 (10th ed.
2016)
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/pf_complete.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y5TC-XS62].
158. 12 C.F.R. § 5.33(e) (2020).
159. Id. § 5.33(e)(A)–(E).
160. Id. § 5.33(e)(ii).
161. Id. § 5.33(e)(iii).
162. Id. § 225.13(a).
163. Id. § 225.13(a)(1)–(2).
164. 12 C.F.R. § 225.13(a)(3).
165. Id. § 225.13(b)(3).
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The DOJ first indicates the product and geographic market as
determined by the Federal Reserve Board.166 It then analyzes the
competitive effect by using calculations made with the HerfindahlHirschman Index (”HHI”).167 The HHI is calculated by squaring the
market shares controlled by the individual market participants and adding
the totals together.168 The DOJ then uses the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines to conduct a five-part test almost identical to the bank merger
test outlined in Phillipsburg National Bank.169 The guidelines consider:
(1) market concentration; (2) adverse competitive effects; (3) the effects
of market entry by the merging bank; (4) the gains in efficiency by the
merger; and (5) the impact of not approving the merger on the relevant
market.170 The DOJ also provides a unique perspective through its
enforcement role solely for the purpose of ensuring that government
action is “procompetitive or not unnecessarily anticompetitive.”171
While there is some overlap, each agency may make its own
determination for what kind of standards should be held in order to
consider a bank merger anticompetitive which can make the final
outcome of a bank merger analysis more unpredictable and contentious
166. See DEP’T OF JUST., BANK MERGER COMPETITIVE REVIEW, 1 (1995) [hereinafter DOJ
BANK MERGER COMPETITIVE REVIEW] (“The banking agencies . . . look[] at competition in
predefined markets developed by the Federal Reserve.”); see also Chad F. Brown, Bank
Mergers in Concentrated Markets: The Role of Mitigating Factors, 2 N.C. BANKING INST.
345, 350 (1998) (“After the [Fed. Reserve] Board specifies the product and geographic
market, it analyzes the market(s) degree of concentration before and after the proposed
transaction.”).
167. See DOJ BANK MERGER COMPETITIVE REVIEW, supra note 166 (“The [DOJ] initially
reviews transactions using data from the banking agencies’ [HHI] screen.”).
168.
DEP’T OF JUST., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 18
(2010)
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P7AT-7BGP].
169. The Department of Justice issues guidelines in collaboration with the Federal Trade
Commission to regulate mergers across all industry lines, including bank mergers. It consists
of a five-part test to determine market concentration by assessing (1) market concentration;
(2) the adverse competitive effects of that market concentration; (3) the timeliness, likeliness,
and sufficiency of entry to counter the adverse effects of decreased competition; (4) assessing
gains in efficiency that could not be accomplished by other means; and (5) assessing whether
or not a company would ultimately fail if a particular merger were not allowed. Killian
explores the relationship between these guidelines and bank merger review more broadly. See
Killian, supra note 147 at 859-60.
170. Killian, supra note 147 at 859–60.
171. Through participation in Executive Branch activities and in regulatory and legislative
processes, the Division seeks to ensure that Government action is procompetitive or not
unnecessarily anticompetitive. Through its own litigation, amicus filings, and in a variety of
other public forums, the Division also seeks to guide the advancement of antitrust
jurisprudence. See DOJ ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 150 (stating that the
mission of the Antitrust Division is the “promotion and maintenance of competition in the
American economy. . . .”).
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than expected. 172 However, when left to judicial review, the Supreme
Court weighs the considerations based on a more absolute finding that
almost any consolidation reduces competition.173 This result likely
contributed to the strategic shift whereby the regulators began to favor
the interests of banks over the integrity of the review process. 174 Banking
regulators would engage in “unorthodox procedures” such as notifying
applicants of issues with the application to allow for voluntary
withdrawal or allowing firms to vet deals before announcing proposed
mergers, effectively creating a pre-process.175 The impact preserves the
reputation of the banks that receive approval. For example, the Federal
Reserve has now approved 3,506 merger applications since 2006 without
issuing a single denial.176
V. CONCLUSION
Banks merge in part because a merger increases the bank’s capital
assets, allows the bank to take the best personnel of the merging banks,
and diversifies its deposits and services.177 Consequently, there is a
strong incentive for banks to merge in order to expand retained
earnings.178 Increasing capital assets not only supports the growth of the
institution’s ability to function within regulatory constraints, but also
enables the bank to acquire stronger management personnel.179
Acquiring better talent to manage the bank or increasing its branches
across a wider geographic location could maximize efficacy, grow
clientele, and enhance the ability to compete for larger clients. 180 While
the incentive to merge may be significant, bank merger regulation
172. See Killian, supra note 147, at 857 (“Tension exists between [Fed. Reserve Board and
the Department of Justice] because at times they disagree on the presence of anticompetitive
effects in the post-merger environment.”); see also Kress, supra note 14, at 445 (“Rather than
clarifying the federal government’s role in bank mergers . . . the Bank Merger Act amplified
confusion about antitrust enforcement in banking.”).
173. See Kintner & Hansen, supra note 34, at 231 (“[T]he Supreme Court served notice
that the antitrust laws were to be applied to bank mergers and that this industry was not going
to be treated differently from any other, notwithstanding the Bank Merger Act . . . .”).
174. See Kress, supra note 14, at 455–56 (“In the late 1990s, the agencies effectively
stopped denying merger applications. Instead, when an agency discovers a problem with a
merger proposal, it now informs the applicant of the issue and gives the bank an opportunity
to withdraw its application.”).
175. Id. at 456–57.
176. Id. at 456.
177. Kintner & Hansen, supra note 34, at 216–17.
178. Id. at 216.
179. Id. at 217.
180. Id. at 216–17.
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functions as a check on consolidation because it “protect[s] the FDIC’s
Deposit Insurance Fund” and “supports strong prudential oversight . . .
.”181
Such incentives have led to banks growing and taking on forms
that have challenged the traditional notions of what a bank is and does to
the extent that federal regulation of bank mergers has expanded
significantly in the past century.182 For example, the easing of geographic
restrictions in state law and advent of online banking has increased
potential competition in many local markets in ways not previously
contemplated by the Bank Merger Act.183 In 1995, the Reagle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (“Reagle-Neal”)
removed significant barriers to merging banks across state borders. 184
Additionally, the emergence of nonbank financial companies has
complicated the way regulators assess competition for financial products
that were once exclusively offered by banks.185 In more recent years,
innovation has brought about non-depository fintech companies that now
provide loans, savings products, and investment advice in direct
competition to traditional banks.186
As the DOJ seeks greater clarity on how the Antitrust Division
applies merger guidelines, it should maintain a clear focus on the core
principles of bank merger review as they are stated in the Bank Merger
Act and interpreted by the Supreme Court.187 The Court is clear that if a
181. See Kress, supra note 14, at 466–68.
182. See id. at 448 (“Over the past several decades . . . competitive considerations have

become increasingly irrelevant in bank merger reviews due to recent regulatory and market
developments.”).
183. See id. at 451 (“[L]iberalized geographic restrictions in the late twentieth century
permitted banks to expand interstate for the first time, freeing firms to enter out-of-state
banking markets that had long been insulated from competition.”).
184. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
185. See Kress, supra note 14, at 452 (“Traditionally, banks were shielded from
competition with savings and loan associations and credit unions under regulations that
limited nonbank depository institutions’ product offerings and restricted their potential
customer base . . ., however, policy makers began easing these constraints in an effort to
enhance nonbank depository institutions’ profitability.”).
186. See id.; see also Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal; Fintech as a Systemic
Phenomenon, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 735, 782–86 (2019) (discussing the threat of fintech in bank
lending).
187. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c); see also United States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank and Tr. Co.,
399 U.S. 350 (1970) (“[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms
in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be
enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such
anti-competitive effects. That principle is applicable to this case”) (quotations omitted).
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merger posed a choice between preserving competition and satisfying the
requirements of convenience and need, “the injury and benefit [are] to be
weighed and decision . . . to rest on which[ever] alternative better serve[s]
the public interest.”188 Several comments advocate for this prioritization
of interests, however, their focus requires a divergence from looking at
the problem strictly from an antitrust perspective. 189 In particular, the
DOJ should reconsider its use of the 1995 Bank Merger Competitive
Review Guidelines.190
The current bank merger review process, which relies
significantly on the HHI, is unequipped to detect some anticompetitive
effects.191 The HHI does not account for how loan pricing or payment
services don’t necessarily correlate with deposits, a key distinction when
the DOJ considers the effects of mergers between large financial
institutions and financial institutions whose core business does not
involve taking deposits.192 Financial institutions that innovate by offering
financial products other than taking deposits, like fintech companies,
188. United States v. Third Nat’l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 185 (1968).
189. See Kress, supra note 14, at 453 (2020) (“The competitive landscape in banking has

changed so significantly in light of [recent] trends that traditional antitrust concerns have
become anachronistic.”). See also Chopra & Kress, supra note 12, at 8 (“In order to prevent
further harms to consumers, honest businesses, and the public, it is critical that the agencies
demonstrate that they their responsibilities under [the] Bank Merger Act . . . .”); Heather
Sturgill, Comments in Response to the Department of Justice Antitrust Division Request for
Public Comments on Updated Bank Merger Review Analysis 1 (Oct. 9, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1330146/download
[https://perma.cc/RB5A-464Z]
(“[T]he Bank Merger Act requires federal agencies to consider the convenience and needs of
the communities to be served as a paramount criterion of merger review in addition to antitrust and safety and soundness considerations.”); Elizabeth Warren, Comments in Response
to the Department of Justice Antitrust Division Request for Public Comments on Updated
Bank
Merger
Review
Analysis
2
(Oct.
16,
2020),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1330251/download [https://perma.cc/GYC7-8GF2 ]
(“These reforms [of bank merger review procedure] are important, and necessary, because the
effects of bank mergers go far beyond their immediate impact on market concentration, with
wide-ranging implications for financial stability and consumer well-being.”).
190. DOJ BANK MERGER COMPETITIVE REVIEW, supra note 166.
191. See Kress, supra note 14 at 464–66 (arguing that competitive considerations alone do
not prevent adverse consequences of bank mergers); see also Jose Azar et al., Ultimate
Ownership and Bank Competition 34-35 (May 4, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (“[Our]
findings suggest that competition authorities should consider complementing HHI-based
analysis with some measure of common ownership concentration”); Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, Comments in Response to the Department of Justice Antitrust Division
Request for Public Comments on Updated Bank Merger Review Analysis 2 (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1330161/download
[https://perma.cc/BGE9-JU2K]
(“The HHI measure may not be the most useful measure for gauging competition, especially
in lending markets.”).
192. See Kress, supra note 14 at 465 (“A narrow focus on HHI obscures the mix of large
and small banks remaining in a market after a merger.).
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credit unions, and savings institutions, should be factored in for a more
dynamic assessment of the relevant product and geographic market. 193
Many public comments in response to the DOJ Antitrust Division request
either a more dynamic adjustment to the HHI or scrapping it for
something else altogether.194 Ultimately a change from the current
approach must be considered in order to ensure that bank merger review
adheres to the standards set by statute and enables the successful
application of antitrust law.195
CHRISTOPHER EARL RHODES JR.*

193. See Indep. Cmty. Bankers of America, supra note 6, at 5 (“[T]he geographic markets
for consumer and small business lending products should no longer be considered local.
Instead, the Department should account for the presence of fintechs and online peer-to-peer
lending services by examining the level of competition in these markets on a national level.”);
see also Conf. of State Bank Supervisors, Comments in Response to the Department of Justice
Antitrust Division Request for Public Comments on Updated Bank Merger Review Analysis
2
(Oct.
16,
2020),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1330331/download
[https://perma.cc/4FJ6-YQSU] (“State bank regulators believe that it is appropriate to account
for competition from credit unions and non-depository financial institutions in calculating
market concentration in bank merger reviews.”).
194. See ANB Bank, Comments in Response to the Department of Justice Antitrust
Division Request for Public Comments on Updated Bank Merger Review Analysis 3 (Oct. 1,
2020), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1330141/download [https://perma.cc/Z6YMPAEU] (“[W]e believe the Division should discard the HHI.”); see also Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Comments in Response to the Department of Justice Antitrust
Division Request for Public Comments on Updated Bank Merger Review Analysis 4 (“HHI
thresholds are not necessarily the right measures to apply to understanding competition in
lending markets. Economic theory suggests that strategic pricing by competitors can
sometimes be competitive even when HHI measures might suggest otherwise.”)
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1330161/download [https://perma.cc/BGE9-JU2K].
195. See Kress, supra note 14, at 465 (“[A]ntitrust analysis alone cannot prevent bank
mergers from adversely affecting consumers and the financial system.”).
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